After all, we can say that something “smells bad” in itself without having to compare it to other smells. Our judgement depends entirely on the relation to other heights. Our judgement here has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on the actual, objective height of the man. And if the average human height were, say, eight feet, then the six foot tall man would be quite short indeed. But to a seven foot tall man, the six foot tall man is obviously short. You can say that a man six feet in height is tall, only because you have some general idea of average human heights, which six feet exceeds. In the example we used, “tall” and “short” are purely relative descriptive features of reality you cannot make sense of one except in conceptual relation to the other. Now, to be fair, there is a sense in which Dawkins’s version strikes at something similar to Aquinas’s. In other words, the argument has nothing to do with “measuring” in relation to some maximum. So Dawkins’s version, that varying degrees between things can only be measured by way of comparison with some maximum, is the exact opposite of Aquinas’s intention: that things which we already compare must point to some maximum, not in order to compare them, but in order to explain why the intrinsic variation, by which we compare them, exists in the first place. That is all unnecessary and ridiculous not to mention the fact that “maximum tallness” might just be nonsensical in itself anyways. There’s no need for some “maximum tallness” by which I measure each person individually, concluding that one is “x-feet” shorter than maximum tallness and the other is “x+1.5” feet shorter, such that the latter must be one and a half feet shorter than the former. “Short” and “tall” are relative descriptions so in order to conclude that one person is taller than another, I really only need to be able to judge between those two people themselves. In order to compare two things, we presumably only need to observe those two things. Which it does, but not for the reason Dawkins insists). At most, his response, if true, commits the defender of his version of the argument–if there even are any such defenders thereof, which I seriously doubt–to holding that God is a “pre-eminently peerless stinker”, not that the argument actually fails in establishing God’s existence. In fact, his response isn’t even an actual objection to his own version at all, unless it’s meant as a reductio ad absurdum.
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(Ironically, he doesn’t even note this in his response. His would be something like this: We can only know that things are “more” or “less” insofar as they are susceptible of comparison to some maximum. In fact, Dawkins’s version has things exactly backwards. The main mistake is in thinking that Aquinas is saying anything about judging “these degrees. There may very well be serious, rigorous objections to the Fourth Way this is not one. This smug rejoinder, while certainly humorous and to the point, amounts to little more than an abysmal intellectual travesty. Or substitute any dimension of comparison you like, and derive an equivalently fatuous conclusion”. Therefore there must exist a pre-eminently peerless stinker, and we call him God. “That’s an argument? You might as well say, people vary in smelliness but we can make the comparison only by reference to a perfect maximum of conceivable smelliness. What’s much worse, however, is his attempt to “answer” the admittedly horrendous caricature : Thomas himself, or any serious commenter/defender that I’m aware of. In all honesty, I’m not really sure from where Dawkins contrived this bastardization of the Fourth Way, but it certainly wasn’t from St. Therefore there must be some other maximum to set the standard for perfection, and we call that maximum God”. Humans can be both good and bad, so the maximum goodness cannot rest in us. But we judge these degrees only by comparison with a maximum. There are degrees of, say, goodness or perfection. We notice that things in the world differ.
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First Dawkins presents his “interpretation” of the argument: By “treated”, I mean that it receives one entire paragraph. Surprisingly, despite its relative obscurity and philosophical technicality, the argument is treated in Richard Dawkins’s infamous The God Delusion. To begin, I think it will be useful to examine certain objections that might arise, since doing so will prepare us to grasp a fuller understanding of the argument itself. Here we shall more fully explain what was presented before, as well as conclude the argument and answer a few lingering questions. In the previous part, we looked at a common Platonic misinterpretation of the argument then we delved into the argument itself.
Dialogue on good evil and the existence of god giraffe series#
This is the fourth and final post in our series examining Aquinas’s Fourth Way, or the Argument from Degrees of Perfection for the existence of God.